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1 Introduction 
This paper is concerned with two generalizations involving negation in yes/no 
(yn-)questions. The first generalization captures an interpretational difference cor­
related with preposed and non-preposed negation in yn-questions (Romero and 
Han, 2001) .  Preposed negation in yn-questions contributes the implicature that the 
speaker believed or at least expected that the positive answer is correct, as in ( 1 )  
(Ladd, 198 1 ;  Han, 1998 ; Btiring and Gunlogson, 2000). 1 Non-preposed negation, 
instead, does not necessarily give rise to this implicature (Han, 1999) : (2) can be a 
way of seeking information on whether John is a teetotaler. 
( 1 )  Doesn't John drink? 
Positive epistemic implicature : The speaker believes or at least expects that 
John drinks. 
(2) Does John not drink? 
No epistemic implicature necessary. 
The contrast can be seen if we take a neutral, epistemically unbiased context 
like (3) and utter the two types of questions : (3S) can be understood in this context 
as an epistemically unbiased question, whereas (3S ' )  necessarily conveys an epis­
temic bias of the speaker.2 Example (4) also illustrates this interpretive difference. 
The resulting generalization is stated in (5). 
(3) Scenario: S hates both Pat and Jane. The prospect of an excursion without 
them pleases S. S does not have any previous belief about whether either of 
them is coming or not. 
A: Pat is not coming. 
S: Great ! Is Jane not coming (either)? That would be the best ! ! !  
S ' : # Great ! Isn't Jane coming (either)? That would be the best ! ! !  
(4) Scenario: Michael has been upset at Sue since yesterday's meeting. The 
speaker is wondering how this could have been avoided. The speaker has no 
belief about what Sue should or should not have done. 
A: Michael has not been happy with Sue since yesterday's meeting. 
S: Should she not have talked to him at the meeting? 
S ' :  # Shouldn't she have talked to him at the meeting? 
(5) GENERALIZATION 1 :  Yn-questions with preposed negation necessarily carry 
the epistemic implicature that the speaker believed or expected that the pos­
itive answer is true. Yn-questions with non-preposed negation do not neces­
sarily carry this epistemic implicature. 
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The second generalization, originally formulated in Ladd ( 198 1 ), states that 
a yn-question with preposed negation Aux+n 't p? -e.g. (6)- is intuitively am­
biguous between two readings : it can be understood as a question about p or as 
a question about 'p. This is suggested by the fact that we can add to (6) a Pos­
itive Polarity Item (PPI) or a Negative Polarity Item (NPI), as shown in (7) with 
too and in (8) with either. In (7),  the intuition is that the speaker is trying to con­
firm or "double-check" the positive proposition p (= "that Jane is coming"). This 
interpretation is enforced by the presence of the PPI too, which cannot be licensed 
under the immediate scope of negation and which presupposes the truth of a par­
allel affirmative proposition ("that pat is coming"). In (8), instead, the speaker 
wants to double-check .p (= "that Jane is not coming") . Again, this interpretation 
is singled out by the use of the NPI either, which needs a c-commanding nega­
tion and which presupposes the truth of a parallel negative proposition (= "that Pat 
is not coming"). We will refer to these readings as p-question (reading) and .p­
question (reading) respectively. We will call yn-questions with preposed negation 
and PPIs "PPI-questions" and yn-questions with preposed negation and NPIs "NPI­
questions" for short. 
(6) Isn 't  Jane coming? 
(7) A: Ok, now that Stephan has come, we are all here. Let's go ! 
S :  Isn't Jane coming too? 
(8) Scenario :  Pat and Jane are two phonologists who are supposed to be speaking 
in our workshop on optimality and acquisition. 
A: Pat i s  not coming. So we don't have any phonologist in the program. 
S :  Isn't Jane coming either? 
It is important to keep in mind that the speaker started with the positive be­
lief/expectation that p both in the PPI-question (7) and in the NPI-question (8) . 3 
In fact, the presence of an epistemic implicature p is a necessary condition for the 
p-question / .p-question ambiguity to arise. Take, for example, a yn-question with 
non-preposed negation like (9) . The presence of too and the only antecedent propo­
sition "that Pat is coming" forces S 's question to be about the positive proposition 
"that Jane is coming". As a result, the only way to understand the question, if 
acceptable at all ,  is with an epistemic implicature: Is she not coming too ? in (9) 
sounds like an archaic rendering of Isn 't she coming too?:  
(9) A: Pat is coming. 
S: What about Jane? Is she not coming too? 
The contrast in (10) makes again the point that the p / .p ambiguity arises only if the 
epistemic implicature is present. The epistemically unbiased scenario in ( 10) allows 
for a non-preposed question (( lOS), already seen in (4)) and for a non-preposed 
question with an NPI, as in ( lOS ' ) .  But, as soon as we add a PPI to try to bring out 
the p-question reading, as in ( lOS"), the question is biased and hence unsuitable 
in this context. Again, Should she not have talked to him already ? sounds like an 
(archaic) rendering of Shouldn 't she have talked to him already ? 4 
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( 10) Scenario: Michael has been upset at Sue since yesterday's  meeting. The 
speaker is wondering how this could have been avoided. The speaker has no 
belief about what Sue should or should not have done. 
A: Michael has not been happy with Sue since yesterday's meeting. 
S: Should she not have talked to him (at the meeting)? 
S ' :  Should she not have talked to him yet? 
S":  # Should she not have talked to him already? 
The intuitive ambiguity between the p-question reading and the --,p-question 
reading -as well as the correlation between the ambiguity and the epistemic 
implicature- is summarized in generalization 2 below. 
( 1 1 )  GENERALIZATION 2 :  Preposed negation yn-questions of  the shape Aux n 't 
p?  (more generally, negative yn-questions with the epistemic implicature p) 
are ambiguous between a question reading double-checking p and a question 
reading double-checking --'p. The use of a PPI versus an NPI disambiguates 
the question towards the p-question reading and towards the --,p-question 
reading respectively. 
The goal of this present paper is to address the two questions below con­
cerning the generalizations 1 and 2. The proposed answers are, in a nutshell ,  as 
follows: 
i . What property correlated with the existence of an implicature distinguishes 
preposed negation from (the non-archaic use of) non-preposed negation? 
ANSWER: Yn-questions with preposed negation necessarily carry Verum Fo­
cus (as in Hohle ( 1992)); yn-questions with non-preposed negation can, but 
do not need to, have Verum Focus. Verum Focus signals the presence of an 
epistemic implicature. 
i i .  Once we identify the property of preposed negation that gives rise to the epis­
temic implicature, how can that property interact with the rest of the elements 
in the sentence to derive Ladd's p-question / --,p-question ambiguity formally? 
ANSWER: Ladd's ambiguity is a scopal ambiguity between negation and the 
VERUM operator arising from Verum Focus. In the p-question reading, nega­
tion scopes over VERUM. In the --,p-question reading, VERUM scopes over 
negation. 
Other important questions about the generalizations 1 and 2 are added be­
low. We will not talk about question (iii) here (see Romero and Han (2001 )  for an 
account of it) . As for question (iv) , it is beyond the aim of this paper to work out a 
formal account of it. However, at the end of this paper, we will speculate on how the 
proposed LF scopal ambiguity between negation and VERUM may open an avenue 
to explain it once some semantic/pragmatic factors are taken into account. 
iii . How exactly does Verum Focus enforce the existence of an epistemic impli­
cature in negative yn-questions? 
VERUM Focus IN NEGATIVE YESINO QUESTIONS 
iv. Why is the implicature raised by preposed negation -both in PPI-questions 
and in NPI-questions- a positive implicature? That is, why is the polarity in 
the question and the polarity in the implicature opposite? 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 tackles question (i), arguing 
for a correlation between Verum Focus in yn-questions and the presence of an epis­
temic implicature. Section 3, which addresses question (ii) ,  uses Verum Focus to 
characterize formally Ladd's intuitive ambiguity. Section 4 presents some specula­
tions about question (iv) . Section 5 summarizes the conclusions. 
2 Preposed vs. non-preposed negation 
In this section, we address the question of what property correlated with the exis­
tence of the implicature distinguishes preposed negation as in ( 1 )  (repeated below 
as ( 12» from non-preposed negation as in (2) (repeated below as ( 1 3» . 
( 12) Doesn't  John drink? 
Positive epistemic implicature: The speaker has the previous belief or expec­
tation that John drinks. 
( 1 3) Does John not drink? 
No epistemic implicature necessary. 
2. 1 Sentential vs. constituent negation will not do it. 
A first way to differentiate between preposed and non-preposed negation would 
maintain that preposed negation in yn-questions is sentential negation, whereas non­
preposed negation is VP constituent negation, negating the event contributed by the 
VP. However, this analysis does not cover all the cases. In ( 14), negation is not 
just negating the event contributed by the VP and is more like a sentential negation 
negating the entire modal proposition. Still, ( 14) does not give rise to a necessary 
epistemic implicature, in contrast with its preposed negation version in ( 15) : 
( 14) Does John not have to go to the meeting? (-,0) 
No epistemic implicature necessarily. 
( 15) Doesn't John have to go to the meeting? (-,0) 
Epistemic implicature: The speaker had the previous belief that John has to 
go to the meeting. 
One could say that negation in (14) is indeed constituent negation. It is just that it 
is negating a bigger constituent than VP. But if we make this move, the distinction 
between constituent and sentential negation becomes murky. 
2.2 Focus is relevant 
Three facts point towards the conclusion that focus is relevant. First, an epistemic 
implicature can be reproduced in affirmative questions if we place Focus stress on 
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the auxiliary: ( 16) can be used to convey the negative implicature that the speaker 
believes that John does not drink. The non-stressed auxiliary version ( 17) is not 
biased in this way. 5 
( 16) DOES John drink? 
Negative epistemic implicature: The speaker believes or expects that John 
does not drinks. 
( 17) Does John drink? 
No epistemic implicature. 
Second, if we take a yn-question with non-preposed negation and place fo­
cus stress on not, the epistemic implicature (of -,p-question type) arises again: 6 
( 1 8) Does John NOT drink? 
Positive epistemic implicature: The speaker has the previous belief or expec­
tation that John drinks. 
Third, preposed negation questions share some interesting similarities with 
tag questions, which clearly bear Focus on the auxiliary. Note that the polarity 
of a question carrying an implicature and the polarity of the implicature itself are 
opposite: 
( 19) Negative yn-questions with preposed negation give rise to a positive epis­
temic implicature. 
Positive yn-questions with focus on the auxiliary give rise to a negative epis­
temic implicature. 
This crossed pattern of implicatures is the same as the distributional pattern of tag 
questions (Sadock, 197 1 ) :  a negative tag question with doesn 't follows an affirma­
tive sentence, and a positive tag question follows a negative declarative. 
(20) a. John drinks, DOESN'T he? 
b. John doesn' t  drink, DOES he? 
In fact, the sequence declarative + tag basically makes the same contribution to the 
discourse as preposed negation questions of p-question type: i .e . ,  they convey that 
the speaker has a belief p and that he wants to confirm p, as in (21) . 7 
(2 1 )  ( . . .  ) The cowb . . .  Didn't the cowboys even finish . . .  They finished pretty close 
to 500 last year, didn't ey? 
All this raises the question of whether the existence of epistemic implica­
tures and the crossed pattern of their polarities is related to focus, in particular to 
polarity focus (Verum Focus in Hahle ( 1992» . If so, all the necessary epistemic 
implicatures above could be given a unified, focus-based treatment. Can we, then, 
assume that there is Focus-marking on the aux+n 't cluster in yn-questions with 
preposed negation? 
VERUM Focus IN NEGATIVE YESINO QUESTIONS 
2.3 Phonetic data 
In Romero and Han (2001) ,  we looked at phonetic data on yn-questions with pre­
posed negation: pitch tracks of naturally occurring data and of contextually con­
trolled sentences in a small experiment. There we showed that preposed negation 
does involve a special pitch curve different from non-focused, non-negative aux­
iliaries. See Appendix for a comparison between the pitch track of the regular 
affirmative question in (22) (low pitch for did) and that of the preposed negation 
question in (23) (higher pitch for didn 't) : 
(22) D(i)d-ya see the game Sunday night? 
(23) ( . . .  ) The cowb . . .  Didn't  the cowboys even finish . . .  They finished pretty close 
to 500 last year, didn't  ey? 
We have also conducted a small experiment that elicits an (unfocused) affir­
mative yn-question and a negative yn-question with preposed negation in appropri­
ate contexts. The results are given in Appendix, showing that the negated auxiliary 
verb has relatively higher pitch than the auxiliary verb in affirmative questions. 
How do these pitch tracks map into pitch accents and into semantic Focus­
marking? Though the mapping is not quite clear, a couple of possibilities arise that 
are compatible with Focus-marking on the preposed aux + n 't cluster. 
As a first possibility, the aux + n 't cluster may have direct F(ocus)-marking. 
In this case, the pitch track of e.g. Wasn 't he in Hawaii ? can be interpreted as 
including two accents relevant for us: one on the aux + n 't cluster and one on 
Hawaii. The first accent gives us F-marking on the aux + n 't cluster directly. This 
is what has been suggested in Hedberg and Sosa (2001) .  They also found that 
preposed negation in yn-questions is characteristically pronounced with a higher 
pitch, parsed as a L+H* accent, that does not necessarily appear in the auxiliary of 
a regular affirmative yn-question. The authors suggest that the accented negative 
polarity is part of the focus -not of the topic- of the sentence. 
The second accent -falling on Hawaii, as clearly signaled by the anchoring 
of the typical L * H- H% final interrogative contour-8 is analyzed as Focus associ­
ated with negation, which is a focus-sensitive operator (Kratzer, 1989). The anal­
ysis of Focus associated with negation in declaratives like (24) simply carries over 
to preposed negation questions like (25) .  No further assumptions need to be made. 
(24) a. John didn't want to MArry Bertha. 
b. John didn't  want to marry BERtha. 
(25) a. Didn't John want to MArry Bertha? 
b. Didn't  John want to marry BERtha? 
As a second possibility, the cluster aux + n 't may have an indirect Focus­
marking. In this case, the pitch track for yn-questions with preposed negation con­
sists of a H*+L accent (or a down stepping sequence of them for longer sentences) 
plus the usual L * H- H% question ending. 9 No F-marking on preposed negation 
needs to arise from the H*+L accent, which signals saliency and inferrability ac­
cording to Pierrehumbert and Hirschberg ( 1990) . As before, the alignment of L * 
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H- H% signals F-marking on Hawaii, and this F-marking is associated with the 
negation. 
Note, though, that semantic Focus-marking in a focus-sensitive operator 
may sometimes surface as a phonetic stress on the associated item and not on the 
operator itself. Take, e .g. ,  (26) . Here, A is asking a regular yn-question, and con­
sequently the main semantic F-marking of the answer is expected to fall on the 
polarity. This is so in (26B).  But what about (26B ')? We still need semantic F­
marking on the negative polarity. The point is that the main F-marking does not 
need to surface as the main stress on the negative element only, but it can simply 
surface on its associated item THEre. 
(26) A: You saw Susan in Greece in August. Did you see her somewhere else last 
summer? 
B :  No, I DIDN'T. 
B ' :  No, I only saw her THEre (last summer). 
In view of these phonetic data and possible analyses, we will assume that 
yn-questions with preposed negation carry focus on the polarity, and that the pres­
ence of polarity focus (Verum Focus) is what triggers all the positive and negative 
epistemic implicatures exemplified in this paper. The assumptions are summarized 
below: 
(27) i .  Polarity focus (Verum Focus, as in  Hahle ( 1992» in yn-questions trig-
gers epistemic implicatures. 
ii .  Preposed negation in yn-questions has the discourse function of Focus­
marking the polarity (Verum Focus, as in Hahle ( 1992» . 10  Given that 
it necessarily has Verum Focus, an epistemic implicature necessarily 
arises . 
iii . Non-preposed negation can but does not need to be focused. Hence, the 
implicature does not necessarily arise. 
In Romero and Han (2001) ,  the assumptions above are pursued to answer question 
(iii) from the introduction: the existence of an implicature follows from the role 
that polarity focus plays in signaling the discourse relation question-superquestion 
(Roberts, 1996) . In the present paper, we will pursue question (ii) instead: How 
can the property of preposed negation related to the epistemic implicature help us 
explain Ladd's p-question / ---,p-question ambiguity? 
3 Ladd's ambiguity in yn-questions with Preposed Negation 
In this section, we address the question of how the property correlated with the nec­
essary epistemic implicature interacts with the rest of the elements in the sentence 
to yield Ladd ( 198 1 ) 's p-question / ---,p-question ambiguity, as was i llustrated in the 
introduction (repeated below as (28) and (29» . Another pair of examples is given 
in (30)-(3 1) .  
(28) A: Ok, now that Stephan has come, we are all here. Let's go ! 
S :  Isn't Jane coming too? 
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(29) Scenario: Pat and Jane are two phonologists who are supposed to be speaking 
in our workshop on optimality and acquisition. 
A: Pat is not coming. So we don't have any phonologist in the program. 
S :  Isn't Jane coming either? 
(30) A: You guys must be starving. You want to get something to eat? 
B: Yeah, isn't  there some vegetarian restaurant around here - Moosewood, 
or something like that? 
(3 1 )  A: I 'd  like to take you out to dinner while I 'm here -we'd have time to go 
somewhere around here before the evening session tonight, don't you think? 
B: I guess, but there is really no place to go to in Hyde Park. 
A: Oh, really, isn ' t  there any vegetarian restaurant around here? 
B :  No, about all we can get is hamburgers and souvlaki . 
How can we formally characterize the two readings of a yn-question with 
preposed negation, a reading "double-checking" p and a reading "double-checking" 
.p? And how can we relate this difference to the use of PPls vs NPls? There are 
three main interacting components in the questions above: (i) the question operator 
Q present in yn-questions in general; (ii) negation present in negative yn-questions; 
and (iii) Verum Focus, which we have argued is necessarily present in preposed 
negation yn-questions. Let us see them in tum. 
The Q operator is the outermost operator in yn-questions. It takes a proposi­
tion as its argument and yields a question meaning, namely, (a function from worlds 
to) the set consisting of that proposition and its complement, as spelled out in (32)­
(33) ,u If we understand question denotations as inducing a partition on the set 
of common background worlds (as in Groenendijk and Stokhof ( 1984)) , the final 
denotation (33d) induces the partition in two balanced cells in (34) . 
(32) [Q] = AP<s ,t>AWsAq<s ,t> [q = P V q = .p] 
(33) a. Is Jane coming? 
(34) 
b. LF: [cp Q [ Jane is coming ] ] 
c .  [Jane is coming] = AW . Jane is coming in W 
d. [Q Jane is coming] (wo ) 
= Aq [q = AW . Jane is coming in W V q = AW . •  (Jane is coming in w) ]  
= {"that Jane is coming", "that Jane is not coming"} 
L.........:....P ______ ---..JI I .p 
The second operator present in all negative yn-questions -with preposed or 
non-preposed negation- is negation itself. We will assume the usual denotation of 
(unfocused) negation: [not] or [n't] takes a proposition and yields its complement, 
as indicated in (35). Note that, as the computation in (36) illustrates, the interaction 
of negation with the lexical denotation of Q does not yield any epistemic implica­
ture. This is what we want, since, as we saw, non-preposed (unfocused) negation 
does not necessarily give rise to an implicature. The resulting partition is the same 
balanced partition as above. 
2 1 1 
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(35) [not] = [n't] = >'P<s ,t> .-'p 
(36) a. Is it not raining? 
(37) 
b. LF: [cp Q [ not [ it is raining ] ] ] 
c .  [Jane is coming] = >.w. ( Jane is coming in w) 
d. [not [Jane is coming]] = >.w.-, ( Jane is coming in w) 
e. [Q Jane is not coming] (wo ) 
= >.q [q = >.w.-, ( it is raining in w) V q = >.w . -,-, (Jane is coming in w) ]  
= {"that Jane is not coming", "that Jane is coming"} 
L-....:..P _______ --'I I -,p 
The final element is Verum Focus. We assume, following Hohle ( 1992), that 
Verum Focus signals the presence of a truth predicate or operator called VERUM. 
Furthermore, we assume that, (at least) in the questions at issue, this VERUM op­
erator is not defined as an alethic operator but as an epistemic operator. That is, 
the denotation of VERUMi is, roughly, the epistemic operator defined in (38a) and 
abbreviated as "FOR-SUREx", where x is a free variable whose value is (usually) 
contextually identified with the addressee in our examples. This is in the spirit 
of (Jacobs, 1986) (cited in Hohle ( 1992)), for whom the alternatives to a focused 
VERUM include negation and epistemic expressions like maybe, possibly, proba­
bly, etc, defined in (38). 1 2 1 3 
(38) a. [VERUMi] = >'P<s ,t>>.w.\;fw' E Epix (w) [P(w') = 1 ] 
= FOR-SUREx 
b. [probablYi] = >'P<s ,t>>.w .MOSTw' E Epix (w) [P(w') = 1 ]  
= PROBABLYx 
c .  [maybei] = >'P<s ,t> >.w .3w' E Epix (w) [P(w') = 1 ] 
= MAYBEx 
d. 
e .  [NOTi] = >'P<s ,t>>.w.-,3w' E Epix (w) [P(w') = 1 ]  
= FOR-SURE-NOTx 
Given these three operators -Q, negation and VERUM- we can now explain 
Ladd's ambiguity as a scopal ambiguity between negation and the VERUM oper­
ator. We propose that, in PPI-questions, negation scopes over VERUM, whereas 
VERUM scopes over negation in NPI-questions. Note that Q operator will not con­
tribute to any scopal ambiguity because it is the outermost operator in questions. 
Let us first look at NPI-questions. Here, VERUM scopes over negation. 
The LF and the denotation for the NPI-question in (39) are given in (40) (ignoring 
the presupposition contributed by either) . The question denotation is schematically 
rendered as a partition in (41 ), taking -'p to be "Jane is not coming". 
(39) Scenario: Pat and Jane are two phonologists who are supposed to be speaking 
in our workshop on optimality and acquisition. 
A: Pat is not coming. So we don't have any phonologist in the program. 
S :  Isn 't Jane coming either? 
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(40) a. Isn't  Jane coming either? 
b. LF: [cp Q VERUMF [ not [IP Jane is coming] either ] ] 
c .  [CP] (wo ) 
= Aq [q = AW.VW' E Epix (w) [-, [come (j) (w') ] ]  V 
q = AW . -,Vw' E Epix (w) [-, [come(j ) (w') ] ]  
= {"it is for sure that Jane is not coming", 
"it is not for sure that Jane is not coming" } 
(4 1 )  NPI-question partition: 




The resulting denotation and partition allow us to characterize formally the 
intuitions about the NPI-question presented in the introduction. First, the NPI­
question is not a regular question but a double-checking question. This is reflected 
in the shape of the partition. Whereas a regular question like (36a) (with no polar­
ity focus and no VERUM) results in the balanced partition (37), the NPI double­
checking question results in the unbalanced partition (4 1) :  the FOR-SURE option 
is in one cell, and all the other epistemic options are in the other cell .  The second 
intuition is that the question has the -,p-question reading. This is clearly captured 
in the partition, where -,p is the argument of all the epistemic operators . Finally, 
since the double-checked proposition is a negative proposition, NPIs are accept­
able and PPIs (under the scope of negation) are not acceptable (Ladusaw, 1980), as 
illustrated in (42) for declaratives : 
(42) a. It is certain [that Jane is not coming either] . 
b. * It is certain [that Jane is not coming too] . 
Let us now turn to PPI-questions. In PPI-questions, negation scopes over 
VERUM. The LF and the denotation for the PPI-question in (43) (ignoring again 
the presupposition contributed by too) are given in (44) . The outcoming partition is 
schematically given in (45), where p is taken to be "that Jane is coming". 
(43) A: Ok, now that Stephan has come, we are all here. Let's go ! 
S :  Isn't  Jane coming too? 
(44) a. Isn 't Jane coming too? 
b. LF: [cp Q not [ VERUMF [IP Jane is coming too] ] ]  
c .  [CP] (wo ) 
= Aq [q = AW. -'VW' E Epix (w) [coming(j) (w') ] ]  V 
q = AW. -,-,Vw' E Epix (w) [coming(j) (w') ] ]  
= {"it i s  not for sure that Jane is coming", 
"it is for sure that Jane is coming" } 
2 1 3  
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(45) PPI-question partition : 




As before, this is not a balanced partition for a regular question, but an unbalanced 
partition for a double-checking question: the FOR-SURE option is in one cell , 
and all the other options are in the other cell . In contrast to NPI-questions how­
ever, in PPI-questions, the proposition that the speaker wants to double-check is p 
(p-question reading), showing that the two interrogatives really denote different 
questions, that is, that the p-question meaning and the -,p-question meaning are 
two truth-conditionally different readings . Finally, since the operator VERUM in­
tervenes between negation and the content of the IP, NPIs are not licensed within 
the IP (Linebarger, 1980), whereas PPIs are. The same pattern is attested for the 
pair either/too. As illustrated in (46) for declaratives, when adjoined to a positive 
proposition, the NPI either is ungrammatical and the PPI too is acceptable. 14 
(46) a. * It is not certain [that Jane is coming either] . 
b. It is not certain [that Jane is coming too] . 
Let us summarize what we have seen so far. We showed in the introduction 
that Ladd's p- / -,p-question ambiguity only arises in negative yn-questions that 
carry an epistemic implicature. Then, in section 2, we argued that all the questions 
with necessary epistemic implicatures seen in this paper have Verum Focus. Once 
we assume the presence of a VERUM operator provided by Verum Focus, we can 
formally account for Ladd's p / -,p ambiguity, its correlation with the presence of 
PPIs vs. NPIs, and the "double-checking" feeling that all these questions have. 1 5 
4 Some Speculations about the Polarity of the Implicature 
Recall question (iv) from the introduction: 
iv. Why is the implicature raised by preposed negation -both in PPI-questions 
and in NPI-questions- a positive implicature? That is, why is the polarity in 
the question and the polarity in the implicature opposite? 
This question can be formulated in another way. Given the fact that both 
PPI-questions and NPI-questions carry the positive epistemic implicature p, the 
choice of double-checking p or double-checking -'p correlates with whose proposi­
tion (i .e . ,  speaker's or addressee's) is being double-checked: when the speaker asks 
the PPI-question about p in (7), she is double-checking her original belief, whereas, 
when she asks the NPI question about -,p in (8), she is double-checking A's implied 
proposition. The question then is: is there anything in the syntax/semantics/pragmatics 
of a PPI-question that forces its content p to be the speaker's belief, and is there any­
thing in the syntax/semantics/pragmatics of an NPI -question that forces its content 
-,p to be the addressee's proposition? 
VERUM Focus IN NEGATIVE YES/No QUESTIONS 
If we assume the semantics and partitions in the previous section, there is 
nothing in the semantics of PPIINPI-questions per se that can help us derive this 
result. For compare the two partitions in (4 1)  and (45) .  If we forge an account to 
derive the speaker's epistemic implicature p from the mathematical object that con­
stitutes the PPI partition (45), wouldn' t  that account wrongly derive the epistemic 
implicature -.p for the parallel NPI partition in (4 1)?  Even more dramatically, take 
the positive yn-question IS Jane coming ? in (47) ,  with Verum Focus on the aux­
iliary. If we compute its denotation (in (48» and its partition (in (49» , we obtain 
exactly the same mathematical partition that we had for the PPI-question (in (45» . 
But, contrary to the PPI-question, the positive question IS Jane coming ? has the 
negative epistemic implicature -'p and not the positive epistemic implicature p. 
(47) IS Jane coming? 
Negative epistemic implicature: The speaker believed or expected that Jane 
is not coming. 
(48) a. IS Jane coming? 
b. LF: [cp Q VERUMF [IP Jane is coming] ] 
c .  [CP] (wo ) 
= Aq [q = AW.VW' E Epix (w) [coming(j) (w') ] ]  V 
q = AW . -.Vw' E Epix (w) [coming (j) (w') ] ]  
= {"it is not for sure that Jane is coming", 
"it is for sure that Jane is coming" } 
(49) Positive question: IS Jane coming? 





Hence, either we change the standard semantics of yn-questions, or we find 
a difference somewhere else. Here, we would like to briefly speculate about how the 
pragmatics of yn-questions may help (although, if the semantics of yn-questions is 
modified appropriately, the same idea may be stated in the semantics). First, let us 
note that, even if two questions yield exactly the same mathematical partition over 
the set of worlds in the common ground, they may differ in acceptability depending 
on the context (see also Bolinger ( 1978» . Take scenario (50) and imagine that the 
speaker is interested in talking about coffee if it turns out that Carlos drank coffee 
and not tea. In this situation, it is natural for the speaker to ask (5 1a) and it is 
unnatural for her to ask (5 1b). Let us say that, even though (5 1a) and (5 1b) induce 
the same partition, their pragmatic "intent" is different. 
(50) Scenario: 
Carlos is unusually nervous and irritable this morning. The speaker knows 
that this can be due to exactly one of the following two reasons: either he 
drank an overdosis of coffee this morning, or he drank an overdosis of tea. 
The speaker does not know which of the two possible explanations is true and 
she wants to find out. Furthermore, the speaker happens to have a scientific 
interest on the effects of coffee on people. 
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(5 1 )  a .  S :  Carlos, did you drink coffee this morning? 
b. S: Carlos, did you drink tea this morning? 
Let us tum to our epistemically biased questions: the NPI-question, the PPI­
question, and the positive question. We saw that they differ on the proposition they 
are trying to double-check. But they also differ in the cell of the partition that is 
chosen to be pronounced, that is, they also differ in the "intent" of the question.  
When we cross the two parameters (double-checked proposition and pronounced 
cell) ,  we obtain an interesting pattern: the intent of the question is only compatible 
with the desired polarity of the epistemic implicature. 
Let us see each case in tum. First, take the NPI-question in (52). The 
pronounced cell is singled out in (53) by a double line. Given that this is the pro­
nounced cell, the paraphrase of the intent of question is roughly as in (52c) : "Can 
you provide information -and, if so, what information-that would make me con­
clude -,p?" 
(52) a. Isn't  Jane coming either? 
b. LF: [cp Q VERUMF [ not [IP Jane is coming] either ] ] 
c .  "Do you have complete evidence for -'p?", or 
"Can you provide information -and, if so, what information-that would 
make me conclude -,p?" 
(53) NPI partition and pronounced cell : 
II FOR-SUREx -,p I I 
r=���==�-----------, 
PROBABLYx -'p 
POSSIBLY x -,p 
FOR-SURE-NOTx -,p 
We see in (54a) that the intent of this question is compatible with the speaker's 
belief p and with the addressee 's proposition -'p. Furthermore, it is incompatible 
with the opposite state of affairs, described in (54b): 
(54) a. Given that I assume p and that you implied -'p, can you provide informa­
tion -and, if so, what information-that would make me conclude -,p? 
b. # Given that I assume -'p and that you implied p, can you provide infor­
mation -and, if so, what info-that would make me conclude -,p? 
Let us now tum to the PPI-question in (55). This time, the pronounced cell ­
with a double line- is the opposite one. The paraphrase of the intent of the question 
is given in (55c). Again, this pragmatic intent gives us the right result in (57): it 
is compatible with the speaker believing p and the addressee implying -,p, but not 
vice-versa. 16 
(55) a. Isn't Jane coming too? 
b. LF: [cp Q not [ VERUMF [IP Jane is coming] too ] ]  
c. "Do you have any (weak or strong) doubts about p?", or 
"Can you provide information -and, if so, what information- that would 
make me doubt p?" 
VERUM Focus IN NEGATIVE YESINO QUESTIONS 
(56) PPI partition and pronounced cell : 




















(57) a. Given that I assume p and that you implied ,p, can you provide infor­
mation -and, if so, what information- that would make me doubt p? 
b. # Given that I assume 'p and that you implied p, can you provide infor­
mation -and, if so, what information- that would make me doubt p? 
Finally, the same reasoning applies to the positive biased question IS Jane 
coming ? Crucially, although the partitions in (56) and in (59) are exactly the same, 
the pronounced cells are opposite. This choice makes the pragmatic intent of the 
two questions different: the PPI-question asks for reasons to doubt p, whereas the 
positive question asks for reasons to conclude that p. As a result, shown in (60), the 
intent of the positive question is compatible with the speaker's belief ,p and with 
the addressee's proposition p and not vice-versa. This is the opposite pattern from 
the one obtained from the PPI-question. 
(58) a. IS Jane coming too? 
b. LF: [cp Q VERUMF [IP Jane is coming] ] 
c .  "Do you have complete evidence that p?", or 
"Can you provide information -and, if so, what information- that would 
make me conclude p?" 
(59) Positive question partition and pronounced cell : 
r=�����-----------' 
PROBABLYx p 
I I FOR-SUREx p I I POSSIBLY x p 
FOR-SURE-NOTx p 
(60) a. # Given that I assume p and that you implied ,p, can you provide infor­
mation -and, if so, what info- that would make me conclude p? 
b. Given that I assume ,p and that you implied p, can you provide infor­
mation -and, if so, what info- that would make me conclude p? 
In sum, in this section, we have sketched some speculations about how to 
derive the polarity of the epistemic implicature from the scopal ambiguity proposed 
for PPI-INPI-questions . In a nutshell ,  when the intent of a question is to ask for 
conclusive evidence for a proposition q, that proposition q is the addressee's im­
plied proposition and the complement proposition is the epistemic implicature of 
the speaker; when the intent of a question is to ask for any possible (weak or strong) 
doubts about a proposition q, q is the original belief of the speaker and its com­
plement is the addressee's proposition. This idea, combined with polarity of the 
"double-checked" proposition, points towards the correct implicature pattern. 17  
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5 Conclusions 
We have argued that Verum Focus (Hohle, 1992) in yn-questions signals the pres­
ence of an epistemic implicature. Preposed negation in yn-questions necessarily 
carries Verum Focus, and hence the epistemic implicature necessarily arises. Non­
preposed negation in yn-questions may or may not be Focus-marked, and hence the 
implicature does not necessarily arise. 
Ladd's p-/-.p-question ambiguity arises only in negative yn-questions with 
an epistemic implicature. The Verum Focus related to the implicature provides an 
epistemic operator VERUM. The scope of VERUM and negation accounts for Ladd 
( 198 1 ) 's ambiguity: in PPI-questions, negation scopes over VERUM and we obtain 
the p-question reading; in NPI-questions, VERUM scopes over negation and we 
obtain the -.p-question reading. 
We have also provided some speculations as to why the polarity of the epis­
temic implicature is opposite from the polarity of the question. By taking in the 
pragmatic intent of the speaker, we argued that this implicature pattern may fall out 
from the interaction between the syntax/semantics of biased questions and general 
pragmatics of questions. The speaker will choose to pronounce the proposition that 
is compatible with her pragmatic intent for asking that question. 
Endnotes 
*We thank Irene Heim, Angelika Kratzer, Anthony Kroch and Barbara Partee for 
extensive discussion and criticism of this paper. This version has also benefited 
from comments from Nancy Hedberg, Mark Liberman, Bill Poser, Ellen Prince, Vli 
Sauerland, Juan Sosa, Mark Steedman, Amim von Stechow, Hubert Truckenbrodt, 
Henk Zeevat, and the audiences of Sinn und Bedeutung 6, Stanford's Department 
of Linguistics, SALT 12, the Penn-Tiibingen meeting and TUbingen's Department 
of Linguistics. All remaining errors are ours. 
1 Although the epistemic effect in ( 1 )  has been dubbed "implicature", it may rather 
be a presupposition. We will not discuss this issue in this paper. 
2Throughout this paper, S is short for speaker, and A is short for addressee . 
3The example (3) showed that a -.p-question with preposed negation cannot be 
epistemically unbiased. (6 1 )  shows the same for p (="that Jane is coming (too)"). 
(6 1 )  Scenario: S is very fond of both Pat and Jane. The prospect of  an excursion 
with them pleases S .  S does not have any previous belief about whether either 
of them is coming or not. 
A: Pat is coming. 
S: Great ! Is Jane coming (too)? That would be the best ! ! !  
S ' : # Great ! Isn't  Jane coming (too)? That would be the best ! ! !  
4(9S) and ( lOS") are reminiscent of archaic non-preposed negation examples as in 
the passage from Merchant o/ Venice in (62): 
(62) Shylock, Act III, Scene 1 :  (Merchant of Venice) 
I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, 
VERUM Pocus IN NEGATIVE YESINO QUESTIONS 
senses, affections, passions? ( . . .  ) If you prick us, do we not bleed? if you 
tickle us, do we not laugh? if you poison us, do we not die? and if you wrong 
us, shall we not revenge? If we are like you in the rest, we will resemble you 
in that. 
It turns out that neg-preposing with n 't is a late development in the history of 
English, first appearing in late 17th century. Before the development of n 't, neg 
preposing occurred with not, as in Hath not a Jew eyes ? in the passage from Mer­
chant of Venice in (62), and examples in (63) from corpus assembled by Ellegard 
( 1953) (made available on-line by Anthony Kroch and Ann Taylor) . 
(63) a .  dyde not our mercyfull lord forgyue all his tespasse? (225-32) 
b. Did not Moses geve you a lawe, and yet none off you kepeth the lawe? 
Gn7- 19) 
c. Did not I se the in the garden with hym? Gn1 8-26) 
In present-day English, only n 't can prepose, while not cannot. But the archaic 
usage of not may have survived, making available the interpretation corresponding 
to not-preposing. 
5pOCUS on the (positive) auxiliary does not give rise to the implicature if it simply 
marks that the question is being re-asked, as in (64) (Creswell (2000) on dictum 
focus) : 
(64) I was wondering whether Sue visited you last week. So, DID she visit you 
last week? 
61f the focus on NOT is simply contrasting with a previous question, as in (65), 
the implicature does not need to arise. As argued in Romero and Han (200 1 ), the 
implicature is necessarily triggered if focus is licensed in a particular way (namely, 
marking the relation between superquestions and subquestions). 
(65) A: Does John drink coffee? 
B :  No, he doesn't. 
A: Does John NOT drink TEA? 
7 As noted in Ladd ( 198 1 ), p-question type and tag questions even share some gram­
matical properties: a negative declarative + post-nuclear tag allows for PPls despite 
negation, as we saw p-questions do: (66) . 
(66) Jane's not coming too=is she? 
8See also Bartels ( 1997) and Gunlogson (2001 )  for the interpretation of rising and 
falling contours in interrogatives and declaratives. 
9This analysis was suggested to us as a possibility by H. Truckenbrodt. 
lOIn this respect, preposed negation behaves like other constructions with non-canonical 
syntax that also encode particular discourse functions, like topicalization, Pocus 
preposing, etc (Kiss, 198 1 ;  Ward, 1988; Prince, 1998) 
l lThe denotation of Q in the text gives Hamblin ( 1973) style question meanings. 
Alternatively, we could follow Karttunen ( 1977) or Groenendi jk and Stokhof ( 1984) 
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to obtain a function that assigns to each world the (set containing the) true answer 
in that world, or we could adopt Larson ( 1985)'s syntax for the Qlwhether operator. 
The choice of one implementation over the other is irrelevant for this paper. 
12The negative epistemic operator FOR-SURE-NOTx in (38e) is the denotation of 
focused NOT. 
1 3The denotation of VERUM is probably not exactly the regular epistemic oper­
ator defined in (38a), but some -usually epistemically fiavored- attitude operator 
relating the speakers, the proposition at issue and the Common Background. E.g. , 
Ladd's example (67) is not so much asking the addressee whether he is entirely cer­
tain about the truth of ...,p (="that the addressee will not lift a finger to help"); rather, 
it seems to ask whether the addressee really wants ...,p to be added to the Common 
Ground, with the consequences that that may have. 
(67) Aren't you gonna lift a finger to help? 
14The (un)grammaticality of the NPIIPPI in (46) is independent of whether negation 
and the NPIIPPI are in the same clause or not. It equally obtains in (68), where all 
the relevant elements are clausemates :  
(68) a. * Jane doesn't  need [to have come either] 
(But ok: Jane doesn't  need [to have come] either) 
b. Jane doesn't need [to have come too] 
(But: * Jane doesn't need [to have come] too) 
15The scope relations between VERUM and negation that we have proposed here 
are independent of the Q operator, and hence one would expect for them to surface 
in constructions other than questions. In fact, Hohle ( 1992) pp 124-6 proposes 
the same scopal ambiguity for German declaratives: in (69), VERUM scopes over 
negation, and, in (70), negation scopes over VERUM. 
(69) a. Karl hat bestimmt nicht gelogen. 
Karl has for-sure not lied. 
"John surely didn't lie." 
b. Karl HAT nicht gelogen. 
Karl HAS not lied. 
"It is true that Karl didn't lie." 
(70) a. Ich hoffe, dass Karl ihr zuhoert. 
I hope, that Karl her-DAT listens. 
"1 hope that Karl listens to her." 
b. Aber Hanna denkt, er HOERT ihr nicht zu. 
But Hanna thinks, he LISTENS her-DAT not PART 
"But Hanna thinks that it is not true that he listens to her." 
16pPI questions are also possible in a context where the addressee did not imply ...,p. 
This context is again compatible with the speaker's intent expressed with the PPI 
question, as in (7 1) .  
VERUM Focus IN NEGATIVE YESINO QUESTIONS 
(7 1 )  a .  Given that I assume p ,  can you provide infonnation -and, i f  so, what 
infonnation- that would make me doubt p? 
b. # Given that I assume -'p, can you provide infonnation -and, if so, what 
infonnation- that would make me doubt p? 
17Besides the p-/-,p-ambiguity, PPI-questions and NPI-questions perhaps also differ 
in the attitude that the speaker takes with respect to the dynamics of the on-going 
infonnation exchange. If so, the intent of the questions can also be used to convey 
that. Take e.g. (72) . The NPI-question in (72a), asking for conclusive evidence 
for the addressee' proposition -'p, may be used when the speaker is seriously con­
sidering switching to -'p. The PPI -question (72b), asking for any doubt about her 
previous belief p, can convey that the speaker is still entertaining/pondering her 
original belief p. 
(72) A: This is the new poetic anthology of the 60s.  Do you want to take a look? 
S: Let me see . . .  Impressive collection of authors . . .  Let me look at the famous 
Rosa Montero. (Searching the table of contents and being surprise that her 
name is not there.) . . .  
a .  Didn't she write any poetry in  the 60s? 
b. Didn't she write some poetry in the 60s? 
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